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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered by Utah's Fifth Judicial 
District Court, Washington County, St. George Department. This Court has Appellate 
Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and Utah Code Ann.§ 
78-A-4-103(2)0). This Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals. The parties 
briefed and argued the case, but prior to the Court of Appeals issuing a decision, on 
November 20, 2015, this Court recalled the case. 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Appellees Samuel and Courtney Adamsons' (the "Adamsons") Issue Presented: 
Did the District Court interpret correctly Utah Code Ann. §§ 
57-1-21 and 23 to mean that when a trustee that is statutorily lacking 
the power of sale under §§ 57-1-21 and 23 moves forward and 
conducts a Foreclosure Sale in violation of the statute and issues a 
Trustee's Deed that the Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed are null 
and void ab initio. 
Appellant Bank of America N .A. ("BANA") presents an issue that is claiming that 
the Utah Supreme Court made a flawed ruling 1 and is asking this Court to revisit its prior 
well written rulings and change them. BANA offers no reason or justification for asking 
~ this Court to set aside its prior rulings and nullify State statute. This Court has already 
ruled that ReconTrust Company, N.A. ("ReconTrust") is not a statutorily qualified trustee 
with the power of sale. Fannie Mae v. Sundquist 2013 UT 45, 311 P.3d 1004, cert 
denied, ("ReconTrust is neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a title insurance 
company or agency with an office in the State of Utah. ReconTrust was not a qualified 
1 Footnote I ofBANA's Original Opening Brief states: "Contrary to the flawed holding in Sundquist ... " See 
Appellant's Original Opening Briefp5. fu. I. 
1 
trustee with the power of sale under Utah Code Sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23.") BANA 
makes statements of issue that assume facts not proven or even considered by the District 
Court. This Court has already settled the issue that ReconTrust is not a qualified trustee 
with the power of sale (Id) and therefore this court cannot respond to BANA's issues 
presented because of the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Fox v. Brigham 
Young Univ., Inc., 2007 UT App 406114, 176 P.3d 446. 
This Court reviews a District Court's interpretation of a statute for correctness. 
McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App. 53,298 P.3d 
666. 
DETERMINATIVE UTAH STATUTES 
78B-6-802.5. Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale. 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(I) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a 
trustee's sale or sherift's sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being 
served with a notice to quit by the purchaser. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-19. Trust deeds -- Definitions of terms. 
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
( 1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as 
2 
the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed as security for 
the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 57-1-20 through 
57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the trustor or other person named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, 
or his successor in interest. 
~ Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds -- Qualifications. 
( 1 )(a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state 
where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to: (A) request 
information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the obligation secured by the 
trust deed; (B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust 
deed and by law; (C) deliver funds to reinstate or pay off the loan secured by the trust 
deed; or (D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the 
property secured by the trust deed; 
*** 
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that: (A) holds a certificate of authority or 
license under Title 3 lA, Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state; (B) is 
actually doing business in the state; and (C) maintains a bona fide office in the state; 
*** 
3 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide office within 
the state if that person maintains a physical office in the state: 
(i) that is open to the public; 
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and 
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person: (A) request information regarding 
a trust deed; or (B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds. 
*** 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the 
beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v), or (vi). 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the 
trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
( 4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to 
create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under 
the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified 
successor trustee under Section 57-1-22. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-23. Sale of trust property -- Power of trustee -- Foreclosure 
of trust deed. 
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the 
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in 
the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for 
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a 
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
4 
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without 
express provision for it in the trust deed. 
Utah Code Ann§ 57-1-23.5. Civil liability for unauthorized person who exercises 
power of sale. 
Go ( 1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee under 
Subsection 57-1-2l{l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
(b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an unauthorized 
person. 
(2) (a) An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to the 
trustor for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the unauthorized sale 
or $2,000, whichever is greater. 
(b) In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff the 
plaintiffs costs and attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee --Payment of bid --
Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser -- Recitals - Effect (57-1-28(2) (b), (c)) 
*** 
(b) The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the requirements of 
Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the exercise of the power of sale and sale of 
~ the property described in the trustee's deed, including recitals concerning: (i) any mailing, 
personal delivery, and publication of the notice of default; (ii) any mailing and the 
publication and posting of the notice of sale; and (iii) the conduct of sale. 
(c) The recitals described in Subsection (2)(b ): (i) constitute prima facie evidence of 
5 
compliance with Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36; and (ii) are conclusive evidence in 
favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice. 
*** 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order issued September 2, 2014, dismissing an 
unlawful detainer action filed by Plaintiff Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC, 
("Distressed Asset") against Samuel D. and Courtney D. Adamson. R. 434-5. BANA, 
however, seeks to persuade this Court to overturn previous well written decisions handed 
down by this Court, and attempts to introduce new material, all of which is irrelevant and 
none of which was presented in their case in chief to the District Court. The material 
BANA seeks to introduce to this Court in their Replacement Brief is in no way binding 
and cannot even be considered persuasive, as it is in direct contravention to the holdings 
of this Court and the Utah Statutes. It appears that BANA is also seeking to introduce the 
material to preserve its positions for future appeals. Although the Adamsons do not seek 
to introduce material that was not part of their case in chief, the A damsons preserve their 
right to do so in the event of a future appeal. 
On April 5, 2010, ReconTrust recorded in the Washington County Recorder's 
Office a void Trustee's Deed purporting to have sold the Adamsons' property at 
foreclosure sale on January 14, 2010. R. 8, Exhibit "A" to Complaint: ReconTrust 
Trustee's Deed; Add. at 7. On January 5, 2014 Distressed Asset recorded in the 
Washington County Recorder's Office a Quitclaim Deed that attempted to convey the 
Adamsons' property from BANA to Distressed Asset. R. 10-13, Exhibit B to Complaint; 
6 
Add. at 10. On February 7, 2014, Distressed Asset, who is not a bona fide purchaser of 
the property, filed an unlawful detainer action against the Adamsons. R. 1-22, 
Complaint; Add. at 1-21. 
During the Adamsons' case-in-chief, Mr. Samuel Adamson testified that he was in 
constant contact with BANA from December 2008 through April of 2010. R. 450, Trial 
Tr. 26:17-27:2, 27:21-29:15; Add. at 41-57. Mr. Adamson testified that even after the 
illegal foreclosure BANA continued to negotiate for a modification. R. 450, Trial Tr. 
30:6-13; Add. at 48. The Adamsons presented evidence that they were prejudiced by the 
1-i) fact that ReconTrust illegally foreclosed on their home. Mr. Adamson testified that he 
was attempting to negotiate a work-out with BANA so that they could become current on 
their mortgage when ReconTrust conducted an illegal foreclosure sale without the 
statutory power of sale. Id. 
On September 2, 2014 the District Court dismissed the unlawful detainer case. 
~ The Court found that according to McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass 'n, 
Inc., 2013 UT App. 53, 298 P.3d 666, the "sale was void based only on the fact that the 
person who conducted it had not been appointed as a trustee as statutorily required." R. 
409; App. at 29. The District Court also found that Distressed Asset is not a bona fide 
purchaser of the Adamsons' property. The District Court stated that under Singer Mfg. 
Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542 ( 1880) the status of a Bona Fide Purchaser "cannot validate 
a void sale." App. at 37; R. 417. The District Court concluded by holding that 
Distressed Asset did not meet their burden of proof of a showing that the Trustee's Sale 
was conducted in accordance with the Utah statutes, and that "Plaintiff has not overcome 
7 
Defendants' defense that there has been no disposition of the property by a trustee's 
sale," as required under Utah Code§ 78B-6-802.5[.]" App. at 39; R 419. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Adamsons purchased their dream home in 2003 on a 30 year fixed mortgage. 
R. 450, Trial Tr. 24:15, 24-25. In 2007 the Adamsons refinanced their home on a 30 year 
fixed mortgage with Guild Mortgage who in turn sold the loan to Country Wide Home 
Loan Servicing LP who in turn sold the loan to BANA. R. 450, Trial Tr. 25:2-25; Add. 
at 42-44. In year 2008 Mr. Adamson's landscape business declined due to the economy. 
Approaching winter, Mr. Adamson's work truck transmission went out and he had to 
spend his accumulated savings on the repairs. Before Mr. Adamson had missed a 
mortgage payment he contacted Bank of America to inform them of the hardship he was 
facing. Mr. Adamson was unable to pay the December 2008 mortgage payment. R. 450, 
Trial Tr. 26: 13-21; Add. at 44. 
Mr. Adamson attempted several times to obtain a loan modification. In the spring 
of2009 Mr. Adamson's work had picked back up and he had the means to make the 
monthly payments, but, according to Mr. Adamson, BANA would not accept his 
payments. In the fall of 2009, Mr. Adamson hired Fortified Financial to assist him in his 
efforts to obtain a loan modification. Because ReconTrust nor bank of America has an 
office in the State of Utah, Mr. Adamson paid Fortified Financial the sum of $3700.00 to 
make contact with Bank of America and assist the Adamsons with negotiations for a loan 
modification. R. 450 Trial Tr. 27:21-28:25; Add. at 45-46. 
In about January 2010 the property was illegally foreclosed upon by ReconTrust 
8 
acting as Trustee of the Deed of Trust. R. 8, Exhibit "A" to Complaint: ReconTrust 
Trustee's Deed; Add. at 7. The property was sold to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP 
FKA CountyWide Home Loans Servicing LP, as Grantee. Id, Void ReconTrust Trustee's 
Deed. 
Prior to the foreclosure and up through April of 2010 the Adamsons kept in 
contact with Bank of America and ReconTrust as they were attempting to obtain a home 
loan modification. Add. at 47-48; R. 450, Trial Tr. 29:1-30:17. At one point Mr. 
Adamson was told that his payments would not be accepted and that he should not make 
any payments. Add. at 56; R 450, Trial Tr. 38:11-22. 
On or about April 5, 2010 BANA attempted eviction proceedings through an 
unlawful detainer action. Add. at 3,r 12; R. 5 ,r12. The District Court dismissed the 
Unlawful Detainer Action. Add. at 4 ,r 21; R. 6 ,r21. That is not the issue of this appeal. 
Four years later BANA issued a Quitclaim Deed to Distressed Asset, who 
~ attempted eviction proceedings through an Unlawful Detainer Action. Add. at 1-21; R. 
1-22, Complaint. Judge Jeffrey Wilcox of the Fifth District Court ruled that eviction 
could not go forward because the Plaintiff, Distressed Asset, had not met the required 
elements of proof of a valid sale. Add. at 22-39; R. 402-420, Decision and Order 
Dismissing Action for Unlawful Detainer. 
Because of the illegal foreclosure sale and issuance of a void Trustee's Deed by 
ReconTrust, the Adamsons claim that their rights were affected, their interests were 
sacrificed, and that there was unfair dealing by BANA and ReconTrust. Add. at 45-48; 
R. 450, Trial Tr. 27:21-30:17, R. 5 ,Il2, R. 6 ,r21, R. 1-22, R. 402-419. Adamsons take 
9 
issue with the fact the lender did not appoint a qualified trustee with the statutory power 
of sale and that an unqualified trustee sold the real property and that the lender is 
claiming that the Trustee's Deed is valid and voidable rather than null and void ab initio. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Adamsons agree that the District Court correctly dismissed the unlawful 
detainer action against them because Distressed Asset was unable to show fulfillment of 
the first element: disposition of the property by a valid Trustee's Sale as required under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802.5. The Adamsons defended against the Unlawful Detainer 
action arguing that the ReconTrust foreclosure sale and Trustee's Deed are null and void 
an initio, and the Court agreed. Add. at 3 9; R. 419. 
This Court cannot overturn the District Court's ruling. The District Court based 
its ruling on Utah Supreme Court case precedents of Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 
542 (1880), Fannie Mae v. Sundquist, 2013 Utah 45,311 P.3d 1004, and McQueen v. 
Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass 'n Inc., 2013 UT App 53,298 P.3d 666. In Singer 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a foreclosure sale performed by one not authorized to 
do so is void. See Singer. Under McQueen, there are three elements required by the Trust 
Deed Act for a proper disposition of real property through a trustee's sale: 1) a valid trust 
relationship, 2) a statutorily authorized trustee, and 3) the adherence to correct procedural 
requirements. McQueen at 670 1 11. A violation of the first two elements would render 
a foreclosure sale and trustee's deed null and void out of operation of law. If the Court 
finds a violation of the third element then the court tests the amount of harm incurred by 
the trustor to determine if the foreclosure sale and Trustee's deed is voidable. 
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ReconTrust does not have the power of sale granted under UCA 57-1-21 
(Sundquist), which is a fatal flaw under the second element of the Trust Deed Act (See 
McQueen ), and therefore renders the foreclosure sale and trustee's deed null and void ab 
initio (See Singer). 
The Adamsons suffered prejudice as a result of the foreclosure sale by 
ReconTrust. The Adamsons were in the process of obtaining a loan modification and 
bringing their mortgage current when they were foreclosed upon by ReconTrust who did 
not have the power of sale as given under Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21(3) (See Sundquist). 
~ R. 450 27 :21-30: 17. ReconTrust is in violation of the statute which was crafted and 
amended to protect the rights of all parties involved (Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F .3d 
1033 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
Distressed Asset is not a bona fide purchaser. BANA cannot overcome the fatal 
flaw that ReconTrust did not have the power of sale as required by a qualified trustee. 
~ And therefore, under Singer, and McQueen, an unqualified trustee cannot conduct a valid 
trustee's sale and no property passes to the buyer. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH ST A TE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN THEY 
INTERPRETED THE TRUST DEED ACT AND RULE THAT THE FORECLOSURE 
SALE AND TRUSTEE'S DEED Is VOID AB INITIO. 
Adamsons agree that the district court issued a correct opinion when it declared 
the Foreclosure Sale conducted by ReconTrust and Trustee's Deed issued by ReconTrust 
null and void ab initio and dismissed the unlawful detainer action. Recon Trust does not 
have the power of sale to enable it to conduct a valid foreclosure sale (Sundquist (In four 
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cases, however, the federal district courts have reached the contrary result and held that 
Utah law is not preempted. Cox v. ReconTrust Co., NA., 2011 WL 835893, at 6 (D. Utah 
2011) (stating that "[u}nder a straightforward reading of [section] 92a(b), this court 
must look to Utah law in its analysis of whether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed 
ReconTrust's trustee powers"); Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., US. Dist. LEXIS 
138519 (D. Utah 2011) (agreeing with the reasoning applied in Cox); Loomis v. Meridias 
Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 5844304 (D. Utah 2011) (same); Bell v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 
860 F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 2012) (same). We find Judge Jenkins' analysis in Bell to be 
particularly persuasive, and follow much of this same analysis here. Like Judge Jenkins, 
we conclude that ReconTrust is subject to the laws of Utah when exercising the power to 
sell property located in Utah.), therefore cannot issue a trustees deed other than a void 
trustee's deed (Singer and McQueen). 
A. The Trust Deed Act Is Interpreted As Requiring Three Elements 
Before A Proper Foreclosure Sale Can Be Held And Valid Trustee's 
Deed Issued. 
Adamsons argue that in McQueen the Court held that the trust deed act dictates the 
necessity of three elements to effectuate a valid foreclosure sale: 1) creation of a trust 
relationship; 2) a qualified trustee; and 3) the adherence to correct procedural 
requirements. McQueen at 670 , 11, holding that "The Trust Deed Act, in addition to 
other procedural requirements like proper notice, requires the creation of a trust 
relationship and the appointment of a qualified trustee." 
I. The Creation Of A Trust Relationship. 
The language of the Utah Trust Deed Act is clear. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-19 
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defines the parties necessary to the creation of the trust relationship, and subsection (3) 
defines the relevant statutory parameters of the Trust Deed Act. A fatal flaw results 
without the formation of a trust relationship between parties, and there would be no 
further inquiry necessary. See McQueen. The Adamsons do not contend that there was 
not a valid trust relationship between the parties. 
2. A Qualified Trustee. 
After the creation of the trust deed relationship, McQueen states that one must 
look to the qualifications of the Trustee, and an unqualified trustee possesses a fatal flaw. 
The controlling statutes that determine the qualification of the trustee are Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 57-1-21, and 23. After analysis of the statutes, the Sundquist court decided that 
ReconTrust is not a qualified Trustee under§§ 57-1-21, and 23. Sundquist at 49. 
Section 57-1-21 prescribes the qualifications of the trustee under the trust deed act. 
Section 57-1-23 is a reiteration of 57-1-21(3), and gives further clarification of how the 
power of sale is to be carried out. 
The importance and significance of the appointment of a qualified trustee is 
described as follows "The purpose of requiring the appointment of a qualified trustee is to 
provide an independent third party who can objectively execute a foreclosure or sale in 
the absence of judicial oversight. See generally Russell v. Lundberg, 2005 UT App 315, , 
22, 120 P.3d 541 ("[A] trustee has a duty to act with reasonable diligence and good faith 
on [the trustor's] behalf consistent with [the trustee's] primary obligation to assure 
payment of the secured debt." (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Indeed, while a trustee's obligations in a trust deed relationship do not 
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normally rise to the level of fiduciary duty, a trustee is not without any duty whatsoever. 
See id. ("While a trustee's primary duty and obligation is to the beneficiary of the trust, 
the trustee's duty to the beneficiary does not imply that the trustee may ignore the trustor's 
rights and interests." ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978) ("The duty of the trustee under a trust deed is 
greater than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the 
default provision of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in 
accordance with a high punctilio of honor."). "This underlying rationale behind the 
trustee requirement thus strengthens our conclusion that a party must appoint a qualified 
trustee in order to enforce an assessment lien without judicial intervention." McQueen at 
673. The appointed trustee, ReconTrust, ignored the Adamsons' rights and interest as 
trustors, and that the Adamsons were not treated fairly as required under case law as sited 
above. 
In his decision to dismiss the unlawful detainer action, Judge Wilcox of the Fifth 
District Court stated "Plaintift's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in 
Utah Code section 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a 
trustee's sale are clearly comparable to the trust deed provisions identifying who was 
authorized to conduct a trustee's sale in Singer, particularly since 'a contract,' such as the 
trust deed here, 'implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered.' 
Washington Nat. Ins. Co v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct. App 1990) 
(citing, among other cases, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 583 P.2d 53, 60 
(Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 601, 24 L.Ed 793 (1878), holding 
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that contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and 
enforcement))); 59 C.J.S Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext Database updated June 2014) 
(The power to sell under deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between the mortgagor and 
mortgagee under the terms and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It 
cannot be enlarged beyond the terms of the contract and the incorporated relevant 
statutes.)" (emphasis omitted). Add. at 27-28; R. 407-8, Decision and Order page 6-7. 
The District Court followed statutory law and case precedent holding that an 
unqualified trustee renders the foreclosure sale and trustees deed null and void ab initio 
and made factual findings that ReconTrust did not have the power of sale necessary to 
effectuate a real property sale in Utah and therefore the Foreclosure Sale on the 
Adamsons' home and the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio. 
Case law fortifies the District Courts interpretation of the Utah statutes. In 
Sundquist the Utah Supreme Court held "In four cases, [ ] the federal district courts have 
(.iib reached the contrary result and held that Utah law is not preempted. Bell v. Countrywide 
Bank, N.A., 860 F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 2012) (holding that a national bank is subject 
to Utah law); Loomis v. Meridias Capital, Inc., No. 2: l 1-cv-363-PMW, 2011 WL 
5844304 (D. Utah Nov. 18, 2011) (same); Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 2:10-
cv-1099-DB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138519 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011) (same); Cox v. 
ReconTrust Co., NA., No. 2:10-CV-492 CW, 2011 WL 835893, at 6 (D. Utah Mar. 3, 
2011) (stating that" [u]nder a straight forward reading of§ 92a(b), this court must look to 
Utah law in its analysis of whether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed ReconTrust's 
trustee powers"). We find Judge Jenkins's analysis in Bell to be particularly persuasive, 
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and follow much of this same analysis here. Like Judge Jenkins, we conclude that 
ReconTrust is subject to the laws of Utah when exercising the power to sell property 
located in Utah." 
The McQueen Court did not enter into an analysis of the obstacles to setting aside 
a trustees sale that were mentioned, and indeed dispositive, in the RM Lifestyles ( RM 
Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison 2011 UT App 290, 263 P.2d 1152) and Reynolds (Reynolds v. 
Woodall, 2012 UT App 206,285 P.3d 7) cases, rather the court simply addressed the 
claimed defect - the absence of the statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on 
its merits, and agreed that it rendered the sale void. Judge Wilcox made the same 
determination as the McQueen court, that is, no analysis is required to determine whether 
or not the sale and Trustee's Deed is voidable because the Sale and Trustee's Deed are 
void out of operation of statutory law. 
Therefore, a court faced with an unqualified trustee need not progress to an 
analysis of the obstacles to setting aside a trustee's sale, since, under operation of 
statutory law, there never was a foreclosure sale because there never was an authorized 
trustee. 
3. A Valid Trustee Must Adhere To Correct Procedural 
Requirements As Stated Under The Code. 
After determining that because ReconTrust did not have the power of sale and that 
the Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed was null and void ab initio, the District Court 
did not move onto the next analysis and look for errors in procedure. The District Court 
was correct in not moving into an analysis for setting aside the sale because in order to 
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set aside the sale, the first two requisites of the Trust Deed Act must have been fulfilled 
(which in this case they were not), and the court correctly pointed out that the sale was 
void. Id; See Sundquist, McQueen, and Singer. 
Adamsons agree with the District Court that because there was no foreclosure sale 
on their home, that no inquiry into the procedural requirements should be entertained. 
However, for purposes of this brief, Adamsons will enter into an analysis of the cases 
under the third element of the Trust Deed Act so that the Court can see how a proper 
analysis should take place and that the cases do not apply to the Adamsons' case. 
After finding that the first two elements of the Trust Deed Act are fulfilled then 
the courts start the analysis to determine if the valid trustee's sale is voidable and that is 
when the burden of proof shifts to the property owner. See RM Lifestyles (requiring a 
showing of fraud or unfair dealing); Reynolds (requiring a showing of fraud or unfair 
dealing); and Timm v. Dewsnip, 2003 UT 47, 86 P.3d 699 (A party who Seeks to have a 
~ trustee sale set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud has the burden of proving 
his contention[.]). 
Adamsons argue that at no time before this point in the analysis are the following 
cases activated, and prior to entering into the analysis to determine if the Foreclosure sale 
is voidable the burden of proof that the statutory requirements are met is on the shoulders 
of the entity invoking the power of sale. "[T]he presumption of validity of sale is not 
conclusive and may be rebutted." Concepts Inc., v First Sec Realty Serv. Inc., 843 P.2d 
1158 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), quoting Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 
S.W.2d 764 {Tex. 1983). 
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Under the third element of the Trust Deed Act, the factors the court generally 
looks to in determining if the foreclosure sale is voidable are '"if the interests of the 
debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing."' RM 
Lifestyles if 16 (quoting Concepts). 
In RM Lifestyles the home owner did not claim that the foreclosure sale was void 
due to lack of power of sale, but rather claimed that the sale was voidable because the 
Notice of Default was improperly recorded. The Court did not find that the trustee had 
violated the first two prongs of the Trust Deed Act. 2 The issue in RM Lifestyles is 
distinguishable from the issue presented by the Adamsons. In RM Lifestyles the property 
owner asked the court to determine if the lack of adherence to the statute requiring a 
properly recorded Notice of Default rendered the foreclosure sale voidable, and in this 
case the Adamsons are claiming that a fatal flaw in trustee rendered the sale and resulting 
trustee's deed null and void ab initio. See RM Lifestyles. 
In Reynolds, the home owner, Reynolds, did not claim that the power of sale had 
been violated. Reynolds asserted that the trustee's sale is void because Woodall recorded 
the notice of default and held the trustee's sale before Citibank executed and recorded a 
written substitution of trustee. Reynolds further argues that because there was no written 
substitution of trustee when Woodall carried out the nonjudicial foreclosure, the 
subsequent attempt at ratification violates the statute of frauds. The court found that 
Reynolds arguments need not be addressed and held that Reynolds has not alleged that 
2 eTitle Insurance Agency is a valid title insurance company in the State of Utah with a with a brick and mortar 
location in Utah. 
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the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights. Again, the issue in Reynolds is 
distinguishable from the present case in that Reynolds did not allege that Woodall did not 
have authority to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property, whereas the Adamsons have 
alleged that their rights were impacted by the fact that ReconTrust is not a valid trustee 
with the power of sale. Reynolds is further distinguishable in that the Trustee, James 
Woodall3, who conducted the Reynolds foreclosure sale is a valid trustee in the State of 
Utah with the power of sale and the lender was able to ratify Woodall' s actions by filing 
a substitution of trustee, whereas ReconTrust is not a valid trustee with the power of sale 
and there is no document that the lender could file that would ratify the void foreclosure 
sale and void trustee's deed. 
Reynolds is also distinguishable from McQueen. In McQueen, the Court held that 
the trustee did not have the power of sale because he never received proper appointment, 
and that the condominium act fell under the Trust Deed Act for the requirements to 
conduct a foreclosure sale. In McQueen the condominium association did not ratify their 
actions by latter appointing the foreclosing attorney as trustee. In Reynolds, the lender 
appointed the foreclosing attorney as trustee after the foreclosure sale. 
In Blodgett the Court refused to set aside a trustee's sale because of irregularities 
in the posting of the Notice of Sale. See Blodgett, ("Such a sale cannot be set aside 
because of irregularities in the publication or posting of notice.") The Adamsons case is 
not like the Blodgett case. The Adamsons are not claiming irregularities in publication or 
posting of sale, but rather claim that the sale itself was void. 
3 James Woodall is a Utah licensed attorney with a brick and mortar office in Utah. 
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In Timm the court stated "the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale is appropriate 
only in cases which reach unjust extremes." Id at ,36. Timm accurately describes the 
prevailing case law in Utah when the first two elements of the Trust Deed Act articulated 
under McQueen have been met. In Timm, the fact that the trustee was validly appointed 
and validly exercised the power of sale is a fact that distinguishes that case and places it 
under the analysis of element three of the Trust Deed Act. In Timm the property owner 
claimed that the sale was defective and voidable because of defective notice of sale. At 
no time did the property owner raise the issue of the lack of the power of sale in the 
trustee. 
In Concepts the property owner claimed that a mistake in the publication of notice 
of sale prevented the trustee from invoking the power of sale. Again, Concepts falls into 
the third element of the Trust Deed Act because the property owner is claiming that there 
was a flaw in the procedure and not that the statutes prevented the trustee from exercising 
the power of sale. 
The line of cases that move through an analysis of the obstacles to setting aside a 
foreclosure sale and a Trustee's Deed are distinguishable from the Adamson case. 
Adamson falls under the Singer, McQueen, Sundquist line of case which deal with the 
fatal flawed trustees that do not have to power of sale, whereas RM Lifestyles, Reynolds, 
Timm, and Concepts all deal with irregularities in the conduct of the trustee, but do not 
deny that the trustee has the power of sale. 
i. The Adamsons Have Suffered Great Harm And Preiudice At The 
Hands Of BANA And ReconTrust. 
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Although the Adamsons agree that the District Court correctly held that the 
~ Trustee' Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio, and that the 
District Court did not need to enter into a test to determine the extent the Adamsons have 
been harmed, for purposes of this brief the Adamsons state their harm. 
Mr. Adamson testified in court that he and his wife were attempting to negotiate 
with the lender to allow them to come current on their mortgage when ReconTrust 
foreclosed on their property. Mr. Adamson testified that he paid a substantial amount of 
money to a company to assist him in his negotiations with BANA because BANA refused 
~ to accept any payments from him. Mr. and Mrs. Adamson further suffered at the hands 
of BANA when they attempted to evict the Adamsons in 2010 and failed, then attempted 
to convey the Adamson property to Distressed Asset who again attempted to evict the 
A damsons. 
B. The Result Of A Proper Analysis Of The Trust Deed Act Requires A 
Finding That The ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed 
Is Null And Void Ab Initio. 
Adamsons argue that there are three possible outcomes when litigating a trustee's 
deed: 1) the Trustee's Deed is void, 2) the Trustee's Deed is voidable, and 3) the 
Trustee's Deed is valid. A finding by the District Court that either of the first two 
elements of the Trust Deed Act have been violated requires a ruling that the Foreclosure 
~ Sale and resulting Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio. Singer and McQueen; Grant 
S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman et al, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW§ 7:21 at 953-57 {6th ed. 
2014 ). Lacking either of the first two elements would render the foreclosure sale and the 
resulting Trustee's deed null and void ab inito. Singer at 547 ("The fact that no injury or 
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fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the question. Nor is it affected by the 
fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party. The sale was made by one not authorized 
to make it, and cannot be upheld. It is simply void, and no one gains any rights under 
it."). 
A determination that the first two elements are met, that there is a valid trust 
relationship and a statutorily authorized trustee would then move the court into a fact 
finding that may render the foreclosure sale and resulting trustee's deed voidable. As the 
Court stated in McQueen "'We employ plain language analysis to carry out the legislative 
purpose of the statute as expressed through the enacted text.' Richards v. Brown, 2012 
UT 14,123, 274 P.3d 911 (footnote citations omitted). Based on this basic rule of 
statutory construction, we agree with the district court's application of the Trust Deed Act 
to a nonjudicial foreclosure of an assessment lien and its determination that the 
appointment of a qualified trustee with the power of sale is necessary to conduct a 
nonjudicial foreclosure or sale[.]" McQueen, p. 672-3 ,IlS. ''The District Court correctly 
construed [ ] the Trust Deed Act to require the appointment of a qualified trustee with the 
power of sale. Because the Association failed to comply with this requirement, we affirm 
the district court's summary judgment ruling that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was 
ineffective and void." McQueen, p 675 ,I 28. 
When interpreting a statute, our goal II is to give effect to the legislature's intent. 11 
State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56,112,240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks omitted). "To 
discern legislative intent, we look first to the statute's plain language. Also, when 




each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. Additionally, [w]e read the 
~ plain language of [a] statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. Furthermore, if the plain meaning of the 
statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Id. 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Courts "should 
avoid adding to or deleting from statutory language, unless absolutely necessary to make 
it a rational statute." Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2002 UT App 371, tJ 11, 58 P.3d 
873. 
Singer, McQueen, and Sundquist require that the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is 
void ab initio. BANA asks the Court to make a determination that the ReconTrust 
Trustee's deed is voidable. But, such a ruling would be contrary to established law. 
Reviewing the history behind the amendments that refined the power of sale is 
enlightening. The most recent amendments to§ 57-1-21 are discussed in the Kleinsmith 
~ case. The case deals with an out of State trustee challenging the Utah foreclosure 
statutes, just as BANA is doing here. As the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals worked 
through§ 57-1-21, the Court stated: 
"A trust deed conveys real property in trust to secure a debt; the debtor, 
who typically has used the loan proceeds to purchase a home, is also the 
trustor. See § 5 7-1-19. In the event of default, the trustee may conduct a 
nonjudicial sale of the property or institute foreclosure proceedings. See 
§57-1-23. According to Mr. Kleinsmith's complaint, as a trustee he could 
"prepare trustee foreclosure sale documents, supervise their recording, 
service, mailing and posting and supervise a crier to conduct foreclosure 
sales, all without personally being present in the state of Utah." 
The initial amendment that harmed his business became effective in April 
2001. It required licensed Utah attorneys to reside in the state in order to 
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qualify as trustees. See 2001 Utah Laws ch. 236 §2. Mr. Kleinsmith 
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the residency requirement 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the 
Constitution. See Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, No. 2:01cv0310 ST, slip op. at 15 
(D.Utah Aug. 13, 2001). 
The legislature then amended the statute effective May 6, 2002, to require 
that attorney trustees either reside in Utah or "maintain[] a bona fide office 
in the state." 2002 Utah Laws ch. 209 § 1. The amendment defined a bona 
fide office as a physical office open to the public and staffed during regular 
business hours, at which a trustor could request infonnation and deliver 
funds in person. Mr. Kleinsmith again challenged the statute's 
constitutionality and again prevailed, this time on the ground that it violated 
the federal Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating 
against out-of-state economic interests. See Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, No. 
2:03-CV-63TC, slip op. at 1-2 (D.Utah July 3, 2003). In response, the Utah 
legislature amended the statute a third time. See 2004 Utah Laws ch. 177 
§ 1. As to the current foreclosure statute the court held: "Making it easier 
for Utahns to meet with trustees, who play a pivotal role in nonjudicial 
foreclosures, is a legitimate state interest. And Utah's legislature could 
rationally have concluded that this interest would be served by requiring 
attorney-trustees to maintain a place within Utah for meeting with trustors 
and other interested persons. 
See Kleinsmith. 
As subsection (2), and (3) of§ 57-1-21 make clear the power of sale is reserved 
for those that do not have an interest in the real property. See UCA § 57-1-21(2), (3). 
The legislature carved out a narrowly defined existence for the exercise of the power of 
sale. This is significant-and illustrates the point that a violation of the power of sale has 
severe consequences. 
Upon examination of the Trust Deed Act and interpreting the Statute, Judge 
Jeffrey Wilcox determined that the ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed is 
null and void ab initio. This is the correct determination according to statue and case law. 
II. THE LACK OF A STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TRUSTEE WITH THE POWER 




Without the appointment of a qualified trustee there can be nothing more than a 
\@ lien on the real property. Subsection (4) of§ 57-1-21 dictates the limitations upon an 
unqualified trustee such as Recon Trust, and states that at most a lien on the property is 
created when there is present an unqualified trustee, such as ReconTrust. 
A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be 
effective to create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale 
and other trustee powers under the trust deed may be exercised only 
if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under 
Section 57-1-22. 
See§ 57-1-21(4). 
The District Court was correct when it stated that the foreclosure sale and Trustees 
Deed is null and void ab initio. 
A. Section 57-1-23.5 Authorizes The Court To Declare The Foreclosure 
Sale And Trustees Deed Null And Void Ab Initio. 
Section 57-1-23.5 defines "Unauthorized person" as a person who does not qualify 
as a trustee under Section 57-1-2l(l)(a)(i) or (iv). See UCA § 57-1-23.5. Section 57-1-
~ 23.5 then states under subsection (2)(a) ""An unauthorized person who conducts an 
unauthorized sale is liable to the trustor for actual damages suffered by the trustor as a 
result of the unauthorized sale or $2000.00, whichever is greater. Id. 
Adamsons agree with the District Court in determining that the statute had no 
retroactive effect and indeed a plane reading of the statute clearly shows that it is not 
written to have such an effect. However, even if the statute were to be intended to be 
retroactive the damage awarded would still render the trustee's sale and deed void as 
~ UCA § 57-1-23.5 gives the Court authority to declare the ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale 
and Trustee's Deed null and void ab initio 
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BANA's reading of the statute is in conflict with the Subsection (4) of§ 57-1-21 
which states the absence of an unauthorized trustee only operates to render a lien on the 
property. The court's ruling that the Trustee's Deed is void is in harmony with both 
statutes where§ 57-1-23.5(2)(a) gives actual damages and§ 57-1-21(4) gives a lien on 
the property. By ruling that the Trustee's Deed is void ("actual damages"§ 57-1-
23.5(2)(a)), BANA returns to the position of mortgage holder ("A trust deed with an 
unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to create a lien on the trust 
property[.]" § 57-1-21( 4)). 
III. BANK OF AMERICA IS IGNORING THE FACT THAT RECONTRUST VIOLA TED 
THE STATUTES AND Is ASKING THIS COURT To IGNORE STATUTE AND 
CASE PRECEDENT. 
Case precedent is well established and has consistently held that a Trustee without 
the power of sale can sell nothing. In the 1880 Singer case, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that no interest in real property could be passed if the foreclosure sale was 
void. Quoting Singer, "The sale was made by one not authorized to make it, and cannot 
be upheld. It is simply void, and no one gains any rights under it."See id. "As Judge 
Jenkins stated in Bell v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., '[a] state bank which Seeks to foreclose 
on real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. A federally chartered 'bank' which 
Seeks to foreclose on such property must comply with Utah law as well."' Sundquist p 17 
,r 51. See Also McQueen. 
IV. ADAMSONS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF WA IVER AND 
ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER AV AUD FORECLOSURE SALE OR 
TRUSTEES DEED. 
Adamsons have not nor can they waive their right to challenge the foreclosure 
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sale. A party may not waive the right to challenge or be stopped from challenging a sale 
wholly void. Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. V. Am. Sav. & Loan As 'n, 775 P.2d 412,414 
(Utah 1989). 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN ITS USE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
As A MEANS To ILLUSTRATE THE FACT THAT THE TRUSTEES DEED Is 
VOID. 
BANA has presented no rule that disallows the District court from using legal 
~ authority to illustrate a point. "The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence 
presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings 
are clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) ( citations omitted). The District Court used the additional legal authority 
to demonstrate that the trail court's ruling is not unique but is well established law. 
VI. BANA's ACTIONS ARE ADVERSE To THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
The State of Utah holds in high regard the power of sale within the Trust Deed 
Gil) Act. The reason for strict compliance with the statute "is to protect the property of the 
debtor", See Concepts citing University Savings Association v. Springwood Shopping 
Center, 644 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1982). After performing a complete analysis of§ 57-
1-21 the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Kleinsmith held that Utah law provides that the 
''power of sale" for trustees of trust deeds conducting non-judicial foreclosures is limited 
(@ to active members of the Utah State Bar and title insurance companies having a place of 
business in the State. See§§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23. See Kleinsmith (upholding the narrow 
power of sale codified as§§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23 as a "legitimate State interest"). 
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VII. THIS COURT CANNOT ENTERTAIN THE ISSUE RAISED IN APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF REGARDING THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOID TRUSTEES 
DEED BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction allowing it to entertain 
the issues raised by BANA regarding the implications of the void trustee's deed on 
current occupants because the issue was not raised or addressed in the District Court. See 
§ 78A-4-103. 
VIII. BANA CANNOT PREVAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM RELYING 
UPON THE STATUTE ALLOWING THEM To FORECLOSE UPON THE REAL 
PROPERTY AND OBTAIN A TRUSTEES DEED. 
BANA is requesting this court to validate what they feel is their statutory relief 
under the Trust Deed Act; however, the right to recover damages is statutory, it can only 
be availed of when there has been a compliance with the conditions upon which the right 
is conferred. See Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589,228 P. 213. "Where a right is Gi> 
purely statutory and is granted upon conditions, one who seeks to enforce the right must 
by allegation and proof bring himself within the conditions." Johnson v. City of 
Glendale, 12 Cal.App.2d 389, 55 P.2d 580. Quoting Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 106 
P.2d 1028, 99 Utah 362 (Utah 1940). 
IX. DISTRESSED ASSET Is NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER. 
Judge Wilcox determined that protection afforded to BFP's by§ 57-1-28 is not 
intended to extend, and does not extend, to protect against defects traditionally viewed as 
fundamental, such as the one at issue here. Singer holds that such status cannot validate a 
void sale. See Singer. McQueen holds the same, and does not validate a void sale 
regardless of the status of the purchaser. See McQueen. 
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Plaintiff BANA attempts to argue that RM Lifestyles holds that there is a 
"presumption that a trustee's deed, which states that it complies with the statutory 
requirements, is 'conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers' of the trustee's 
deed's validity." See RM Lifestyles 117 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii)). 
However, section 57-1-28 is not meant to be inclusive of fundamental defects such as a 
trustee without the power of sale but conducting a foreclosure sale and issuing a trustee's 
deed. In the District Court's decision, Judge Wilcox cites Main I Ltd. P 'ship v. Venture 
Capital Const. & Dev. Corp., 154 Ariz. 256,260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
<@ 1987) ( observing, with reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to 
that of Utah, and without apparent disagreement, that ''[ w ]hen the California cases hold 
that recitals in a deed of trust are conclusive, they qualify that they are conclusive 'in the 
~ 
absence of grounds for equitable relief,"' but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a 
case where there was no fraud, misrepresentation, concealment," bad faith or breach of 
~ fiduciary duty). Add. at 38; R. 418. Judge Wilcox then turns to 5 Tiffany REAL PROP.§ 
1550 (3d ed.), to illustrate the statutory intent. Tiffany states, "It appears that the sale 
will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been previously 
enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or was 
conducted by a party without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was 
substantially defective." R. 419. 
X. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
No cases cited by BANA support a policy that is good for the public and does not 
create confusion. No case cited by BANA can justify its position that Sundquist is an 
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errant decision. 
Yet, in a vain attempt at justification, BANA takes the position that Sundquist is 
an errant decision by attempting to convince this Court that it is good policy to over look 
the 8000-plus illegal foreclosures that BANA performed through ReconTrust. This runs 
contrary to the policy that this Court and the legislature have created and upheld for over 
100 years: that a property owner cannot be taken advantage of because they are in 
distress. 
Ruling that the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is void, however, brings to light 
another issue: what happens to the homeowner that purchased the home in reliance on the 
title company's statements that the Trustee's Deed is valid. The title insurance company 
has an obligation to determine if the documents existing in a chain of title comply with 
statues and indicate a clean title to real property. As one of the members of the group 
that has the power of sale, the title insurance companies should have been on notice that 
the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is void. Therefore, either the current homeowner or the 
previous home owner who was the subject of a void ReconTrust Trustee's Deed can, by 
using §57-1-23.5, seek damages against the title insurance company issuing the title 
policy. And, the title insurance company can in tum seek damages against BANA and 
ReconTrust, thereby laying the burden of responsibility for violating the Utah Statutes on 





This Court should not reverse the District Court' s decision dismissing Distressed 
Asset's unlawful detainer. The Adamsons are entitled to receive and should be awarded 
their attorney's fees resulting from this appeal. 
Dated this February 2nd, 20 16 Respectfully Submitted 
Samuel D. and Courtney D. Adamson 
jcb@.johnchristianbarlmv.com 
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Plaintiff Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC, by and through its cowisel, complains of 
Defendants Samuel D. Adamson, Courtney D. Adamson, and John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant and 
alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
I . Plaintiff is a corporation with its principal place of business in the State of 
California 
Version I Revised 1 I /25/2013 
A-1 
2. Defendants are individuals residing in Washington County, State of Utah. 
ruRISDICTION 
3. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to §78A-5-
102, Utah Code Annotated 
VENUE 
4. Venue is proper in this case pw-suant to §78B-3-301, Utah Code Annotated. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
5. On or about August 31, 2007, Samuel D. Adamson as trustor, executed and 
delivered to Scott Lundberg, as Trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as 
nominee for Guild Mortgage Company its successors and assigns, as beneficiary, a Trust Deed to 
secure the perfonnance by the trustor of his obligation under a Trust Deed Note (the "Note0 ) 
executed and delivered for valid consideration to the beneficiary. 
6. The Trust Deed covered real property situated in Washington County, State of Utah, 
located at 70 West Orchard Lane, Washington, UT 84780, more particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 1HIRTY ONE (31), THE FIELDS - PHASE 1, according to the 
official plat thereof, on file in the office of the recorder of Washington County, State 
of Utah. 
7. The trustor defaulted in performing the provisions of the Trust Deed and Note, and, 
pursuant to a Notice of Default and Election to Sell recorded in the Washington County Recorder's 
Office on June 25, 2009, as Entry No. 20090024680, and a Notice of Sale, the property described in 
said Trust Deed (the "Property") was sold at a trustee's sale on January 14, 2010 to BAC Home 
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Loans Servicing, LP FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP ("BAC Home Loans"). A copy 
of the Trustee's Deed is attached as Exhibit A. 
8. On December 18, 2013, Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home 
Loans, transferred title to Plaintiff by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed ("Quitclaim Deed"). A copy of 
the Quitclaim Deed is attached as Exhibit B. 
9. On January 6, 2014, the Quitclaim Deed was recorded with Washington County 
~ Recorder's Office, as Enny No. 20140000387. 
10. Plaintiff gave good and valuable consideration for the Property without notice of any 
claims to the Property. 
11. Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser of the Property. 
12. Notably, on April 22, 2010, BAC Home Loans filed its own action against 
Defendants in the Fifth District Court, Washington County for the State of Utah, identified as Case 
No. 100501437, for unlawful detainer (the ''2010 Eviction Case"). 
13. Defendants Samuel D. Adamson and Courtney D. Adamson in this action were the 
same Defendants in the 2010 Eviction Case. 
14. The Property involved in this action is the same Property involved in the 2010 
Eviction Case. 
15. On July 7, 2010, Defendants, through their counsel at the time, filed in the 2010 
Eviction Case, a Motion and Memorandum in Support to Set Aside Sale. 
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16. On August 4, 2010, BAC Home Loans filed an Objection to the Motion to Set Aside 
the Sale in the 2010 Eviction Case. 
17. On August 16, 2010, the Court in the 2010 Eviction Case scheduled a hearing on 
September 1, 2010 to hear all pending motions, including Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale in 
the 2010 Eviction Case. 
18. Neither BAC Home Loans, nor Defendants Samuel D. Adamson, Courtney D. 
Adamson, appeared at the hearing on September 1, 2010 in the 2010 Eviction Case. 
19. On October 22, 2010, the Court in the 2010 Eviction Case entered an Order denying 
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale. 
20. But for a Notice of Office Relocation and Address Change filed on September 13, 
2011 in the 2010 Eviction Case, no substantive action was taken by Defendants after October 22, 
2010, the date the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale. 
21. On June 21, 2012, the Court dismissed the 2010 Eviction Case. 
22. Although Defendants were aware of possible claims to the Property as of July 7, 
2010, the date they filed their Motion to Set Aside Sale in the 2010 Eviction Case, Defendants failed 
to assert such rights, if any, after October 22, 2010, the date the Court denied Defendants' Motion to 
Set Aside Sale. 
23. Defendants failed to take any action to set aside the trustee's sale on January 14, 
2010 after October 22, 2010, the date the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale. 
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24. Defendants have failed to pay any value to Plaintiff for possession of the Property 
after January 6, 2014. 
25. Defendants have failed to pay any value to any party for possession of the Property 
after January 14, 2010. 
26. Defendants have failed to pay property taxes on the Property after January 14, 2010. 
27. Defendants failed to record a lis pendens upon the Property after January 14, 2010. 
28. Defendants have occupied the Property since January 14, 2010. 
29. From and since January 14, 2010, Defendants have been tenants .. at-will. 
30. On January 27, 2014, pursuant to Sections §78B-6-802.5, §78B-6-802 and §78B-6-
805, Utah Code Annotated, Plaintiff caused to be served on Defendants Notices to Quit, copies of 
which are attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
31. The Notices to Quit infonned the Defendants that the Plaintiff had elected to 
tenninate the tenancy-at-will and notified Defendants that their failme to vacate the Property within 
five (5) days would result in their being in unlawful detainer. 
32. Defendants have failed to vacate and yield po~ession of the Property to the Plaintiff. 
33. Defendants are, therefore, in unlawful detainer of the Property as provided in 
Section §78B-6-802.S and §78B-6-802, Utah Code Annotated. 
34. The fair rental value for the Property is $1,200.00 per month. Said amount 
constitutes damage to the Plaintiff occasioned by the Defendants' unlawful detainer. 
Ver-ion I 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows: 
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A. Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants ordering said 
Defendants to vacate the Property located at 70 West Orchard Lane, Washington, UT 84780, more 
particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT THIRTY ONE (31), THE FIELDS - PHASE 1, according to the 
official plat thereof, on file in the office of the recorder of Washington County, State 
ofUtah 
B. Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the amount equal to 
the daily fair rental value multiplied by the nwnber of days Defendant remains in the home 
calculated from the expiration of the Notice to Quit. This amount to be trebled pursuant to U .C.A. 
§78B-6-811 et seq., plus any damages occasioned to the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendants' 
unlawful detention of the Subject Property. 
C. For Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
D. Judgment for such additional and further relief as may be equitable. 
DATED this 7'11 day of February, 2014. 
~ Name: Jh-b 0\ D Q_ J:! ~ t=-- .-. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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NOTICE TO OUIT 
Samuel D Adamson 
70 West Orchard Lane 
Washington, UT 84780 
You are notifi~ pursuant to provisions of sections §78B-6-80'2.5 and §78B-6-802, Utah Code 
Annotated. that you are required to vacate the property located at 70 West Orchard Lane, 
Washington, UT 84780, more particularly descnoed as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 1HIRTY ONE (31), nIE FILEDS -PHASE 1, according to the 
official plat thereof: on file in the office of the recorder of Washington Co\Dlty, State 
ofUtah 
and surrender the possession thereof to Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC ("DASj within five 
(S) days after service of this notice upon you. 
On January 14, 2010, at 1:00 p.m., Recontrust Company, N.A., Trustee under a Trust Deed dated 
August 31, 2007, and executed by Samuel D. Adamson, as trustor, in mvor of Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for. Guild Mortgage Company m successors and assigns, 
caused the above referenced property to be sold at a public sale. At the sale, the property was sold 
to DAS. Bank of America, N.A. subsequently transferred to Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I. 
LLC by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed dated December 18, 2013 and recorded January 6, 2014. From 
and since that time, you have been a tenant at will. DAS has elected to terminate said tmmcy. 
In the event that you fail to vacate the property within five (5) days from the date on which you 
receive this notice, you will be guilty of unlawful detainer as provided by sections §78B-6-802.S 
and §788-6-SoZ Utah Code Annotated, and appropriate legal action will be instituted against you 
for possession of the premises and for treble damages as provided for by section §7813-6-811, llmb 
Code Annotated. 
DATEDthis t.J dayofJanuary,2014. 
L&A Case No: 14-40881NV 
Printed Name: ( o-.. g\ ]) l. }\ A.A "' 
Attorneys for DAS 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411S 
Telephone: (801) 263-3400 
A-15 
IMPORTANT NOTICE TO SERVICEMEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS: 
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVll., REJJEF ACT 
Servicemembers on "active duty" or "active service," or a dependent of such a servicemember 
may be entitled to certain legal protections, including eviction protection, pursuant to the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SO USC App.§§ S01-S96), as amended, (the "SCRAj and, 
possibly, certain related state statutes. 
Who may be entitled to Legal Protections under the SCRA: 
• Active duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and 
active service National Guard; 
• Active service members of the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration; 
• Active service members of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service; 
• United States citizens servicing with the armed forces of a nation with which the United 
States is allied in the prosecution of a war or military action; and 
• Their spouses. 
Servicemembers and dependents with questions about the SCRA should contact their unit's 
Judge Advocate, or their installation's Legal Assistance Officer .. A military legal assistance 
office locator for all branches of the Armed Fo?CeS is available at 
http://legalassistance.law.af.miJ/content/locator.php. 
"Military OneSource" is the U.S. Department of Defense's information resource. If you are listed 
as entitled to legal protections under the SCRA, please go to www JDilitaryonesource.com/scra or 
call l-800-342-9647 (toll free from the United States) to find out more information. Dialing 
instructions for areas outside the United States are provided on the website. 
If you are such a servicem.ember, or a dependent of such a servicemember. you should contact 
Lwdberg & Associates eviction department at (801) 263-3400 ext 398 to discuss your status under 
theSCRA. 











PO Box 3324 
St. George, Utah 84771 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
(NOTICE TO QUIT) 
Case No.14-40881 / W 
I, Fredrick Neilson, being a resident of the state of UTAH, and a citizen of the United States of at least 
18 years or age at the time of service herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, (NOTICE TO QUIT) on January 27, 2014 and served the same 
upon Samuel D. Adamson, a within named occupant in said article(s) by posting a true copy of said 
article(s) for the occupant the front door of the residence located at 70 West Orchard Lane, Washington, 
Utah 84780 on January 28, 2014 at 7:35 AM 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said article(s), I endorsed the date and place of service 
and added my name and offlclal title thereto. 
UCA 78B-5-705, I declare under criminal penalty that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on: January 28, 2014. 
Private lnvestig tor 
Utah License No. G-102697 
TOT AL CHARGES: $40.00 
NOTES 
A-17 
John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant 
70 West Orchard Lane 
Washingto~ UT 84780 
NOTICE TO QUIT 
You are notified, pursuant to provisions of sections §78B-6-802.5 and §78:B-6-802, Utah Code 
Annotated, that you are required to vacate the property located at 70 West Orchard Lane, 
Washington, UT 84780, more particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT THIRTY ONE (31), 1llE FILEDS - PHASE 1, according to the 
official plat thereof, on file in the office of the recorder of Washington County, State 
ofUtah 
and surrender the possession thereof to Distressed Asset Solutions FlUld I, LLC ("DAS'') within 
five {S) days after service of this notice upon you. 
On January 14, 2010, at 1:00 p.m., Recontrust Company, N.A., Trustee under a Trust Deed dated 
August 31, 2007, and executed by Samuel D. Adamson, as trustor, in favor of Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Guild Mortgage Company its successors and amigos, 
caused the above referenced property to be sold at a public sale. At the sale, the property was sold 
to DAS .. Bank of America, N.A. subsequently 1J8DSferred to Distressed AJmet Solutions Fund I, 
LLC by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed dated December 18, 2013 and recorded January 6, 2014. From 
and since that time, you have been a tenant at will DAS bas elected to terminate P.aid tenancy. 
You must hnm.ediately adyise Lundberg and Assoefates tr you are a pap• oeeupyig !N! 
property within 10 days from reeeipt of this notice. 
In the event that you fail to vacate the property within ninety (90) days if you are a bona fide tenant, 
as defined by Trtle VIl-Protectjng Tenant.q at Foreclosure Act or within five (S) days ftom the date 
on which you receive this notice, if you are not a bona fide tenant, you will be guilty of unlawful 
detainer as provided by sections §78:B-6-802.5 and §78B-6-802, Utah Code Annotated, and 
appropriate legal action will be instituted against you for posse8mon of the premises and for treble 













defined as a renter or leasehold occupant paying fair market rental resulting from an arms length 
transaction. 




Attomeys for DAS 
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411S 
Telephone: (801) 263-3400 
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IMPORTANT NOTICE TO SERVICEMEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS: 
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
Servicemembers on "active duty" or "active service," or a dependent of such a servicemember may be 
entitled to certain legal protections, including eviction protection, pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil 
Relief Act (SO USC App.§§ S01-S96), as amended, (the "SCRAj and, possibly, certain related state 
statutes. 
Who may be entitled to Legal Protections ander the SCRA: 
• Active duty members of the Anny, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and active 
service National Guard; 
• Active service members of the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration; 
• Active service members of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service; 
• United States citizens servicing with the armed forces of a nation with which the United States is 
allied in the prosecution of a war or military action; and 
• Their spouses. 
Servicemembers and dependents with questions about the SCRA should contact their unit's Judge 
Advocate, or their installation's Legal Assistance Officer. A military legal assistance office locator for all 
branches of the Armed Forces is available at http:lnegalassistance.law.af.miJ/content/1ocator.pbp. 
"Militmy OneSource" is the U.S. Department of Defense's information resource. If you are listed as 
entitled to legal protections under the SCRA, please go to www.militaryonesource.com/scra or call 1-800-
342-9647 (toll free from the United States) to find out more information. Dialing instructions for areas 
outside the United S1ates are provided on the website. 
If you are such a servicemember, or a dependent of such a servicemember, you should contact Lundberg 
& Associates eviction department at (801) 263-3400 ext 398 to discuu your status under the SCRA. 
DISCLOSURE REGARDING: 
PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOS1JRE ACT 
If you are a tenant, you may be allowed under Federal law to continue to occupy your nn1al unit until 
your rental or lease agreement expires, or until 90 days after the sale of the property at auction, whichever 
is later. If your rental or lease agreement expires after the 90-day period, you may need to provide a copy 
of your rental or lease agreement to the new owner to prove your right to remain on the property longer 
than the 90 days after the sale of the property. 
You must continue to pay your rent and comply with all other requirements of your rental or lease 
agreement or you will be subject to eviction for violating your rental or lease agreement. 
L&A Case No: 14-40881NV 




PO Box 3324 
St. George, Utah 84771 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
(NOTICE TO QUIT) 
Case No.14-40881 / W 
I, Fredrick Neilson, being a resident of the state of UTAH, and a citizen of the United States of at least 
18 years or age at the time of service herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, (NOTICE TO QUIT) on January 27, 2014 and served the same 
upon John Doe / Jane Doe / Occupant, a within named occupant in said article(s) by posting a true copy 
of said article(s) for the occupant the front door of the residence located at 70 West Orchard Lane, 
Washington, Utah 84780 on January 28, 2014 at 7:35 AM 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said article(s). I endorsed the date and place of service 
and added my name and official title thereto. 
UCA 788-5-705, I declare under criminal penalty that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on: January 28, 2014. 
Private lnvestlg tor 
Utah License No. G-102697 
TOTAL CHARGES: $10.00 
NOTES 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DISTRESSED ASSET SOLUTIONS FUND 
I, LLC, DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING 
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON; COURTNEY D. 
ADAMSON; et al., 
Case No. 140500067 
Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox 
Defendants. 
This is an action for unlawful detainer, which came on for trial on August 7, 2014, after 
which the court took the matter under advisement. The court now dismisses this action for the 
reasons given below. 
A-22 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5, 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a 
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after 
being served with a notice to quit by the purchaser. 
At trial, Plaintiff presented as exhibits certified copies of the notice of default, the trust 
deed, and its own quitclaim deed, thus making out a prima facie case under the statute. 1 
In defense, however, Defendants raised the issue of whether subdivision (l)'s 
requirement of''disposition of the property by a trustee's sale'' has been satisfied.2 There appears 
to be no question that Defendants defaulted on their obligations under a note secured by a trust 
deed, and that ReconTrust, acting as trustee, gave notice of default and intention to sell the 
property, and ultimately conducted a trustee's sale in January 2010, purporting to sell the 
~ property to Plaintiff's predecessor in interest. 
Defendants argue that because the 2010 trustee's sale was conducted by ReconTrust, who 
was not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23, 
~Fed.Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,I 13,311 P.3d 1004 ("ReconTrust is 
neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a title insurance company or agency with an office in 
the State of Utah. ReconTrust was therefore not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under 
Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23."); i!6149 ("As a national bank operating in Utah 
1 Plaintiff also agreed to file, after trial, a certified copy of the 2007 trust deed, but thus 
far has not done so. 
2 In addressing this defense, the court considers, in addition to the evidence and 
argwnents presented at trial, the briefing submitted on Defendants' Motion for Declaratory 
Judgment. At trial, the court indicated that it would not grant such motion at that time because 
there was nothing in Defendants' pleadings suggesting that they were seeking declaratory relief. 
However, also as indicated at trial, the motion addresses the substance of Defendants' defense, so 
the court references such briefing as a matter of convenience. Plaintiff's opposition memorandum 
filed May 23, 2014, is referenced herein as "Mem. Opp." 
2 
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under the (National Banking Act], ReconTrust is precluded from exercising the power of a 
trustee under Utah statute for purposes of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure."), the sale and 
resulting trust deed are null and void ab initio. 
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Sundguist court expressly declined to decide what effect, 
if any, its determination that ReconTrust did not qualify as a trustee with the power of sale would 
have on the validity of the sale and resulting trust deed. See liL 1 50 ("Our opinion in this matter 
is limited to the narrow issue of whether Utah law regarding the qualification of trustees is 
preempted by the [National Banking Act]. In briefing and oral argument, the parties have 
attempted to raise a variety of other issues relating to the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale, the validity of the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of restitution. Because these 
issues were not fully litigated below, we decline to reach them on interlocutory appeal.''). 
However, as Plaintiff also points out, the Court of Appeals has been presented with 
arguments similar to those of Defendants, and has not even considered it necessary to reach them 
where the party attacking the validity of a trustee's sale failed to allege or prove how its rights 
were affected by the defect complained of. For example, in RM Lifesn,les, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 
UT App 290, 263 P .3d 1152, the defendants in an unlawful detainer action "argued that the trust 
deed sale was void because [the trustee] recorded the notice of default before it had been 
substituted as trustee, that the statute did not allow [the beneficiary] to ratify [the trustee's] 
action, and that the execution of the substitution of trustee violated the statute of frauds." Id., 1 
3 
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15. On review, the Court of Appeals declined to "reach the merits of these issues because the 
[defendants], in attacking the trust deed sale's validity after the sale, ha[d] not met their burden 
of proving that the alleged irregularity affected their rights," id. (footnote omitted), and "[did] not 
claim that they were denied the right to cure the default or ever planned on or were capable of 
curing the default." hh, 118 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206,285 P.3d 7, the plaintiff argued 
~ ''that the trustee's sale [was] void" because the individual who "recorded the notice of default and 
held the trustee's sale" did so "before [the beneficiary] executed and recorded a written 
substitution of trustee." 14:., ,r 13. The plaintiff also challenged the beneficiary's later "attempt to 
ratify [this individual's] actions after the trustee sale." ML, In other words, like Defendants here, 
the plaintiff attacked the validity of the sale based on the questionable authority of the one who 
'@ conducted it. Again, the Court of Appeals declined to decide these issues on their merits based on 
the fact that, "in attacking the validity of the trustee's sale, [the plaintiff] ha[d] not alleged that 
the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights." Id. 
In contrast to RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are two cases cited by Defendants. First, in an 
early Utah Supreme Court case, the court held a trust sale void where it was not performed by the 
person authorized under the deed of trust: 
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States Marshal. 
This was not done. One of his deputies made the sale as auctioneer. It is not 
claimed that he acted as deputy, but simply that a person who was a deputy acted 
4 
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as the auctioneer. Nor do we think that the marshal could have acted by deputy, 
unless the deed of trust had shown express authority to that effect, which it did not 
do. The fact that no injuzy or fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the 
question. Nor is it affected by the fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party. 
The sale was made by one not authorized to make it, and cannot be upheld. It is 
simply void, and no one gains any rights under it. A purchaser must know that the 
sale is made by the proper person. The deed of trust shows who could make the 
sale. A trustee can no doubt employ an auctioneer to act for him in crying off the 
property; but the trustee must be present and superintend the sale. The trustee in 
the present instance says that he does not think he was present at the sale. 
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers. 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880) (emphasis added). 
More recently, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale for delinquent assessments owed to a condominium association was void where 
the sale was conducted by the association's attorney because "[t]he record reveal[ed] that, though 
its attorney may have qualified as a trustee under the Trust Deed Act, the Association failed to 
appoint its attorney as such." McOueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass1n, Inc., 2013 
UT App 53, 11 19-21 & 28, 298 P .3d 666. 
Notably, the McOueen court does not discuss the obstacles to setting aside a trustee sale 
that were mentioned, and indeed dispositive, in the RM Lifestyles and Reynolds cases, as 
summarized above. Rather, the court simply addressed the claimed defect-the absence of the 
statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on its merits, and agreed that it rendered the sale 
void. Reconciliation of these cases is difficult. 
Reconciliation of Singer with RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also difficult. To say, as do 
5 
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these later cases, that a party attacking the validity of a trustee sale must allege that the claimed 
defect resulted in an injury to "the interests of the debtor," or "some attendant fraud or unfair 
dealing," RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16, or a circumstance "reach[ing] unjust 
extremes," id.; Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206, ~ 15, is plainly at odds with Singer's statement that, 
where an unauthorized person conducts the sale, "[t]he fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has 
been shown, does not affect the question." 2 Utah at 547. 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Singer on the ground that the deed of trust in that case 
specified who could conduct the sale, and that there is no such provision in the trust deed here. 
Plaintiff also notes that Singer was decided well before the current governing statutes, and 
criticizes Defendants for not providing any additional authority to support their argument that the 
sale here is void. 
Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in Utah Code sections 57-1-
21 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a trustee's sale are clearly comparable to 
the trust deed provision identifying who was authorized to conduct the sale in Singer, particularly 
since "a contract," such as the trust deed here, ''implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it 
was entered."3 Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct. 
3 It is unnecessary to decide which law to apply here (i.e., the law in effect in August 
2007, when the trust deed was executed, or the law in effect in January 2010, when the trust sale 




App. 1990) (citing, among other cases, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53, 
60 (Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595,601, 24 L.Ed. 793 (1878) (holding that 
contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement))); 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) ("The power to sell under 
deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between [the] mortgagor and mortgagee under the tenns 
and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It cannot be enlarged beyond the tenns 
of the contract and the incomorated relevant statutes.") ( emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 
Thus, this attempted distinction fails. 
Second, while Singer is an older case, it is consistent with prevailing law on the subject 
today, as well as with current Utah statutory law. As a leading treatise on real estate financing 
explains: 
A-28 
Generally, defects in the exercise of a power of sale can be categorized in at least 
three ways - void, voidable, or inconsequential. 
Some defects are so substantial that they render the sale void. In this situation, 
neither legal nor equitable title transfers to the sale purchaser or subsequent 
grantees, except perhaps by adverse possession .... A sale ... is void when 
someone other than the named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor 
who has not been validly appointed, or, conversely, if the original trustee conducts 
the sale after a successor-trustee has been appointed. 
Most defects render the foreclosure voidable and not void. When a voidable error 
occurs, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser, subject to the redemption 
rights of those injured by the defective foreclosure. Typically, a voidable error is 
"an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale" and must be "substantial or 
result in a probable unfairness." ... If the defect only renders the sale voidable, 
7 
the redemption rights can be cut off if a bona fide purchaser for value acquires the 
land. When this occurs, an action for damages against the foreclosing mortgagee 
or trustee may be the only remaining remedy. 
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential that they render the sale neither void 
nor voidable. These defects commonly involve minor discrepancies in the notice 
of sale .... 
Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman et al, Real Estate Finance Law § 7:21 at 953-957 (6th ed. 
2014) (hereinafter Nelson & Whitman) (underscoring added and footnotes omitted; italics in 
~ original). 
Viewed within this framework, Singer clearly takes its place in the first category, and the 
prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are seen to be 
applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering a sale voidable rather than 
void. This is consistent with Singer, which expressly disavows any such prerequisites as to a sale 
~ conducted by one not authorized to do so. It is also consistent with McOueen, which affirmed 
that a sale was void based only on the fact that the person who conducted it had not been 
appointed as a trustee as statutorily required. 
The limited applicability of the prerequisites stated in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also 
shown by examination of the cases cited therein. For instance, both cases quote the statement 
made in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, I 160 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam), that "[a] sale once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were 
sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing." 2011 UT App 290, ,I 16; 2012 
8 
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UT App 206, ~ 14. Concepts involved the attempted invalidation of a sale based on the fact that 
the notice of sale, which was printed in 1983, incorrectly stated that the sale was to be conducted 
on a given date in 1982, see 743 P.2d at 1159-a defect that the court ultimately characterized as 
a "minor typographical error." Id. at 1161. Thus, the statement quoted is clearly taken from a case 
falling into the third category described above ( one involving "minor discrepancies in the notice 
of sale"), not one involving what Singer held to be a fundamental error.4 
Similarly, RM Lifestyles and Reynolds each state that a trustee's sale should be set aside 
"only in cases which reach unjust extremes." 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16; 2012 UT App 206, 115. 
For this proposition, RM Lifestyles cites Thomas v. Johnson, 80 I P .2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), which in tum cited Concepts, ~ id., and which involved only a challenge to the manner 
in which the sale was conducted- namely, the trustee's acceptance of a bid offering to pay "fair 
market value" (rather than a specific dollar amount) for the property. The court rejected this 
challenge, holding that the statute was satisfied by the bid and "find[ing] no evidence that [the 
4 Significantly, Concepts actually reiterates the underlying principle from Singer 
(although with a different focus in mind-namely, the party intended to benefit from statutory 
notice requirements), that "[t]he maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may condition the 
exercise of the power upon such conditions as he may describe." 743 P.2d at 1160 (citing 
Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983)) (emphasis 
omitted). The cited case elaborates, as noted in Concepts, saying that "[t]he grantor of the power 
[of sale] is entitled to have his directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have 
it to take place at the time and place, and by the person appointed by him." 650 S.W.2d at 768 




debtor's] interests were sacrificed by the trustee's action .... " Id. at 189.5 RM Lifestyles and 
Reynolds also cite Thrun v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ,I,I 36-37, 86 P.3d 699, which again merely 
reiterated the holding of Concepts, and which, like Concepts, involved - as pertinent here - only 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the notice of the sale given to the debtor. Id. 
Thus, none of the cases cited to support the prerequisites identified in RM Lifestyles and 
Reynolds involved "a purported sale by an unauthorized person," which is to be distinguished 
~ from cases in which there is merely "a question of procedural irregularities in a trustee's sale." 
Citizens Bank of Edina v. W. Quincy Auto Auction, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1987) (en 
bane). Where, as here (and as in Singer), there is "a completely unauthorized sale conducted by 
an individual who was powerless to sell the property," it is irrelevant "[ w ]hether in point of fact, 
the sale of the property was conducted in all respects judiciously or not, or in a manner most 
w conducive to the interests of those concerned," although "[t]his would be a legitimate inquiry in a 
proceeding to set aside a sale made under the power conferred by the instrument. ... " Id. 
( citation omitted). This conclusion is inconsistent with Reynolds, but that case must yield to 
Singer based on the principle that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply cannot overrule the law as 
5 Thomas also included a footnote summarily rejecting the debtor's additional challenge 
in that case to the trustee's acceptance of a credit bid rather than "requir[ing] the bid to be 
'payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale,' as allegedly instructed in the 
trust deed"- a provision that, if it existed, the court held to be satisfied by the credit bid. See 801 
P.2d at 188 n.1. 
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announced by the highest court in the state, even if the announcement was made decades ago." 
Sentry Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Plaintiff also relies on the holding in Reynolds that, "[a]bsent such exceptional 
circumstances [i.e., harm to the interests of the debtor, fraud, unfair dealing, or unjust extremes], 
the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge 
irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is executed 
and delivered to the purchaser." 2012 UT App 206, ,I 15 (citing RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 
290, ,I 15 n.4 (internal citation omitted)) ( emphasis added). Because, as just discussed, 
Reynolds's requirement of harm, etc. as a prerequisite to setting aside a trustee's sale must be 
limited (under Singer) to those cases involving defects rendering a sale voidable rather than void, 
the companion requirement that challenges to irregularities be raised via a pre-sale injunction 
proceeding, except where harm, etc., is shown, must likewise be so limited. To hold otherwise 
would be to say that a debtor need not attempt to obtain a pre-sale injunction in a case in which 
the sale is only voidable (because it may be set aside thereafter by a showing of harm, etc.), but 
that such an attempt must be made where the sale is utterly void. 
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that "the doctrines of waiver and estoppel bar Defendants' 
claim that the Foreclosure Sale is void and should be set aside." Mem. Opp. at 9. To support this 
argument, Plaintiff observes that 
Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred. It is 
11 
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undisputed that the Foreclosure Sale took place in January 2010. It is also 
undisputed that although the Defendants in this case filed a class-action suit in 
federal court in November 20 I 0, they have not prosecuted their claims in the 
Federal Action since the ruling in Garrett in September 2013, which ruled that a 
foreclosure sale done in Utah by ReconTrust was valid. It is undisputed that 
Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside the Foreclosure Sale in the Prior State 
Case in July 2010, but failed to prosecute this claim, and allowed the case to be 
dismissed on June 21, 2012. Importantly, although the Defendants in this case 
were, or are, parties in the Prior State Action and Federal Action respectively, they 
failed to ever record a lis pendens on the Property. It is also undisputed that 
Defendants have failed to pay any value, and have failed to pay property taxes, for 
the Property since June 2009. Like the mortgagor in American Falls Canal 
Securities Co., the Defendants in this case have failed to properly and timely 
assert their rights to defeat the rights of Plaintiff, an innocent bona fide purchaser. 
Defendants have knowingly and silently sat on any alleged rights they have to the 
Property, and most importantly, have allowed Plaintiff to expend money 
purchasing the Property. Defendants do not claim they had the ability to cure the 
default and stop the Foreclosure Sale. Defendants did not challenge the sale before 
it occU1Ted, and therefore, the Trustee's Deed from ReconTrust must remain 
valid. [FN] 1 
[FN]l Even if the court considered a trustee's deed voidable, "[a] voidable deed .. 
. 'is unassailable in the hands of a [bona fide purchaser]."' See SEC v. Madison 
Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Utah 2009) (citation 
omitted). 
Mem. Opp. at 9-10. 
In the American Falls case cited, the Supreme Court recognized that "a party otherwise in 
position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded from doing so based 
upon conduct sufficient to bring into operation the doctrines of waiver and estoppel." Am. Falls 
Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted). 
The court indicated, however, that a party may not waive the right to challenge, or be estopped 
12 
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from challenging, a sale wholly void, see id. ("(E]xcept where non-compliance results in a 
complete legal nullizy. one otherwise entitled to object to a judicial sale in mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings as involving a defect or irregularity based upon a lack of or insufficient process, 
notice, advertisement or other designation with respect to the sale, designed for his benefit and 
protection, may waive, or be estopped from asserting, such defect or irregularity.") ( emphasis 
added and citation omitted);~ also Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ~ 22, 189 P.3d 51, 57 
( distinguishing "' ... between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires,' which could 
become enforceable by ratification or estoppel") (quoting Millard Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank 
of Millard Cnty., 80 Utah 170, 14 P .2d 967, 971-72 ( 1932)), which, under Singer, is what results 
from a trustee's sale conducted by one not having authority.6 
Moreover, even where it has been said that "(a] want of authority in the trustee making 
the sale may be waived by the parties in interest, or they may estop themselves by their conduct 
to object to such want of authority, at least as against the purchaser at the sale," 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages§ 764 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Kroff, 144 Mo. 
433, 46 S.W. 424 (1898); Spencer v. Hawkins, 39 N.C. 288, 4 Ired. Eq. 288, 1846 WL 1113 
6 Plaintiff relies on Ockey. which held that a conveyance effected by trustees after the 
termination of the trust ''was merely voidable" rather than void,~ 2008 UT 37, ,I 24, and on 
Millard County, which held that securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority 
were likewise only voidable, see id., 122, but these cases did not involve a trustee's foreclosure 
sale, in which context the clear rule is shown by Singer and the other authorities discussed above. 
13 
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(1846); Schwarz v. Kellogg. 243 S.W. 179 (Mo. 1922)), the conduct giving rise to the waiver or 
estoppel in the cited cases was considerably more affirmative than anything Defendants are 
alleged to have done here. 
Certainly, Defendants' failure to pay taxes or any other value for the property since June 
2009,7 while remaining in possession, is understandably frustrating for the foreclosure sale 
purchaser (or its successor in interest), but it is not inconsistent with their claim that the sale is 
vii void, 8 nor can their failure to affirmatively pursue judicial vindication of their position during 
this period properly be so characterized.9 g: Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn. 259, 261, 256 
1 At trial, Mr. Adamson actually acknowledged not having made payments since 
December 2008, explaining that, since April 2010, their lender refused to accept any payments. 
8 Indeed, under the circumstances, it would be the making of payments to the purchaser at 
the sale, or to its successor in interest, that would be would be inconsistent with Defendants' 
claim. 
9 Defendants' federal class-action lawsuit (initiated in November 2010), was stayed 
pending the outcome of Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 546 F. App'x 736 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(which, contrary to Plaintifrs suggestion, did not unqualifiedly hold ''that ReconTrust had the 
authority to act as a trustee in Utah, and therefore, the foreclosure sale that took place in the 
Garrett case was valid," Mem. Opp. at 3), and appears to remain pending. Resolution of the 
"Prior State Case" (case number 100501437 in this court) is difficult to follow. This was an 
unlawful detainer action filed against Defendants by Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, and 
appears to have been dismissed due to the failure of both sides to appear at a hearing on or about 
June 19, 2012. (The Order of Dismissal is a minute entry for a hearing that appears to have been 
held on June 19, 2012 (the date of the caption), but the signature line on the order is dated June 
20, 2012, which is also the file stamp date, and the order was filed in CORIS on June 21, 2012.) 
However, the parties in the case had previously stipulated to continue the scheduled trial 
"without date," an order to that effect was entered on November 17, 2011, and no prior notice of 
any hearing scheduled thereafter appears in CORIS. 
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N.W. 94, 95 (1934) (property occupants claiming under mortgagor one year after void 
foreclosure sale were "rightfully in possession" and could not be barred from challenging the 
validity of such sale by statute requiring any challenge to be brought "with reasonable diligence," 
the principle being that "one who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have 
his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit against that other within a time 
specified to test the validity of a claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It 
has consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five years, makes a recorded 
deed purporting to be executed under a statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could 
not be valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of the land. Limitation 
laws cannot compel a resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the complete 
enjoyment of all he claims.") ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true of 
Defendants' failure to file a lis pendens, as they have explained, since a void sale transfers no 
title under Singer, and there was no need to bring their challenge prior to the sale, as discussed 
above. 
Plaintiff argues that some of the same conduct just discussed also constituted a 
ratification of the foreclosure sale, but the court disagrees for the same reasons such conduct is 
not an estoppel or waiver, not least of which is the fact that, as Plaintiff itself recognizes, "[a] 





Plaintiff also argues that the statutory remedy set forth in Utah Code section 57-1-23.5 is 
exclusive, but this section was not added until 2011, the year after the sale at issue here, and 
Plaintiff has made no argument to show its retroactive applicability. 
Finally, Plaintiff stresses that it is a bona fide purchaser for value. Assuming that to be 
true, 10 however, Singer clearly holds that such status cannot validate a void sale. This 
determination is not altered by Utah Code section 57-1-28's provision stating that trust deed 
'J> "recitals of compliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the 
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described in the trustee's deed" "are 
conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without 
notice.'' Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii). 
For obvious reasons, such provisions cannot be taken completely at face value. See 
~ Nelson & Whitman§ 7.22 at 982 (describing "[t]he literal language of this ... type of statute" as 
"breathtakingly broad in its impact on BFPs" as it "arguably applies even when the mortgagee 
had no substantive right to foreclose," such as where "a lender forecloses though the secured 
obligation is not in default or if the mortgage is forged" - a result that would be "fundamentally 
unfair and is probably legislatively unintended"). In an earlier treatment of the subject, Nelson 
10 Such an assumption may be unduly generous, given that Defendants have remained in 
possession of the property challenging the validity of the sale at all times since the sale, thereby 
giving notice to Plaintiff, prior to Plaintiff's purchase, of the claimed defect in the exercise of the 
power of sale. 
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and Whitman went as far as to assert that "the conclusive impact" of such statutes should be 
limited "to procedural defects in the foreclosure process," consistent with the likely legislative 
intent. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Refonning Foreclosure: The Unifonn 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1506-1507 (2004). 
Although this suggested bright-line limitation did not find its way into the most recent 
version of Nelson and Whitman's treatise, it appears to accurately reflect how these "conclusive" 
statutory presumptions should be understood. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. & 
Dev. Com.~ 154 Ariz. 256,260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (observing, with 
reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to that of Utah, and without 
apparent disagreement, that "[w]hen the California cases hold that recitals in a deed of trust are 
conclusive, they qualify that they are conclusive 'in the absence of grounds for eguitable relief,"' 
but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a case where there was no "fraud, misrepresentation, 
... concealment," bad faith, or breach of fiduciary duty) (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
Among the traditional grounds for equitable relief not specifically mentioned in Main I is, as 
previously indicated, the absence of a power of sale in the party conducting such sale. See 5 
Tiffany Real Prop.§ 1550 (3d ed.) (WestlawNext database updated September 2013) ("It appears 
that the sale will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been 
previously enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or 
was conducted by a pa.ny without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was substantially 
17 
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defective.") ( emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Thus, the court concludes that the 
protection afforded to BFPs by Utah Code section 57-1-28 is not intended to extend, and does 
not extend, to protect against defects traditionally viewed as fundamental, such as the one at issue 
here. 
For these reasons, the court holds that Plaintiff has not overcome Defendants' defense 
that there has been no "disposition of the property by a trustee's sale," as required under Utah 
iii; Code section 78B-6-802.5, and accordingly dismisses this unlawful detainer action. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs' unlawful detainer action is dismissed. 
Dated this Q.tJ'--day of September, 2014. 
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1 to know what they did when they received the 
2 notice of default. I would like some evidence 
3 from your clients as to what they did, whether 
4 they attended the sale. I have no idea on that, 
5 and I think I need that background to help me. 
6 MR. BARLOW: Okay, yes, Judge, we can do 
7 that. What I would like to do is call Mr. Sam 
8 Adamson to the stand. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Adamson, if 
10 you'd raise your right hand, the clerk will 
11 administer an oath, and then you can come take a 
12 seat in the witness stand. 
13 Whereupon, 
14 SAMUEL ADAMSON, 
was administered the following oath by the court 
16 clerk. 
17 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
18 the testimony you give in the case now pending 
19 before the court will be the truth, the whole 
20 truth, and nothing but the truth. 
21 THE v-JITNESS: 1 do. 
22 
23 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BARLOW: 
25 Q Mr. Adamson, will you please state and 
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Samuel Don Adamson. 
Please spell your name for the record. 
S-A-M-U-E-L, Don D-O-N, Adamson 
5 A-D-A-M-S-O-N. 
6 Q Mr. Adamson, you've heard the judge ask 
7 specific questions. Let's go through those. Will 
8 you please tell the Court when you moved into the 
9 property and where will you please first state 
10 where the property is located? 
11 A The property is located at 70 West 
12 Orchard Lane, Washington, Utah 84780. 
13 Q Will you please state when you moved 








We moved into the property May of 2003. 
May of 2003? 
Correct. 
THE COURT: And just tell me briefly, 
19 you purchased the home. How much you purchased it 
20 for, if you financed it and what the terms of 
21 your what your payments were. 
22 THE WITNESS: Originally? 
23 THE COURT: Yeah. 
24 THE WITNESS: It was right around 
25 154,000, and the terms were 30 years, and the 
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1 payments were $1,190. 
2 THE COURT: And I don't mean to take 
3 over the questioning, but did you refinance, I 





Correct, in 2007. 
And can you tell me about 
7 that just a little bit? 
8 THE WITNESS: We refinanced to 
9 consolidate some debt. 
10 THE COURT: And what were the terms; do 
11 you remember? 
12 THE WITNESS: I might be off on this a 
13 little bit, but -- our payment was right around 
14 $1,900 a month for 30 years. 
15 amount financed. 
I can't remember the 
16 THE COURT: And that's fine. And who 
17 did you refinance it through? Not the mortgage 
18 company but do you remember who your debt was to? 
19 Was it Bank of America? 
20 THE WITNESS: It was Guild Mortgage 
21 originally, and then it sold to Bank of America. 
22 MR. BARLOW: Judge, I think I have on 
23 here that Guild Mortgage was the finance company 
24 and then it sold to -- not Bank of America but 
25 Countrywide and then Bank of America. 
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1 THE COURT: I 'm sorry. It was who 
2 initially? 
3 THE {l\1ITNESS: Guild Mortgage. 
4 THE COURT: It was Countrywide do you 
5 think? 
6 MR. BARLOW: That's what I have. 
7 THE WITNESS: That sounds right. 
8 THE COURT: I'm going to allow both 
9 counsel to follow up on questions, so if you 
10 wouldn't mind, Mr. Adamson, I'm going to ask a few 
11 more. And I take it that at some point you were 
12 having trouble making payments; is that right? 
13 THE WITNESS: Correct. In December of 
14 2008 I owned a landscape maintenance company. At 
15 that time the transmission went out on my work 
16 truck and took my funds that I had set aside for 
17 the winter since it's a seasonal business. I 
18 contacted Bank of America before I even missed my 
19 first payment and let them know of my hardship. 
20 They continued to tell me that they would work 
21 with me and to stay in contact, for which T did. 
22 MR. DeHAAN: I'm going to object to 
23 that, Your Honor, on the basis of hearsay. 
24 of America is not a party. 
Bank 
25 THE COURT: It's not coming in for the 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 26 





1 truthfulness of the matter asserted. It's coming 
2 in for background, and I'm going to allow it. 
3 And I guess at some point you learned 
4 that there was a foreclosure. 
5 notice of default? 






Counsel, would you ask him 
8 if this would be the document that he received. 
9 BY MR. BARLOW: 
10 Q Mr. Adamson, I believe you've just been 
11 handed Exhibit No. 1. Is that the document that 
12 you received issued by ReconTrust? 
13 A It looks familiar. It's been a few 
14 years since I reviewed it but, yes. 
15 Q Was this document sent to you or taped 
16 to your door? How did you receive this document? 
17 
18 
A Recalling, taped to my door. 
THE COURT: What did you do after you 
19 found that it had been taped to your door; do you 
20 recall? 
21 THE WITNESS: I did try several times to 
22 do a loan modification at that time. 
23 back a little bit on time frame? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
Can I go 
24 
25 THE WITNESS: I did originally miss 
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1 December's payment of 2008. Stayed in contact 
2 with Bank of America January and February because 
3 those were sti..1.l my slow months. In March I had 
4 started picking back up for the year and contacted 
S them to make a payment because they agreed every 
6 month that I had contacted them that they would 
7 work with me to get caught back up. 
8 At that point I was notified that I 
9 would have to come up with the 7,000 that I was 
10 behind, and I simply stated that that's not really 
11 working with me. That's me just getting caught 
12 back up. So not really knowing what to do being 
13 young in life, I did try loan modifications by 
14 myself, was told by Bank of America that T did 
15 qualify; that they would be sending me paperwork 
16 to sign, and that I was to get it right back to 
17 them which I never saw any paperwork to sign and 
18 get back to them. 
19 In fall of 2009 I hired a company that 
20 was a loan modification specialist called 
21 Fortified Financial and paid them a large sum of 
22 money to help them assist to figure this out. 






How much did you pay that company? 
$3,700. 
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1 THE COURT: Did you ever try and contact 
2 ReconTrust company or counsel about the notice of 
3 default? 
4 THE WITNESS: I never would have thought 
5 to call or contact ReconTrust. Fortified 
6 Financial and me did get Bank of America and 
7 ReconTrust on a three-way call because we had a 
8 concern about the sale date. I can't remember 
9 exactly the year. You might have it on record. 
10 One company is stating it was sold in February 
11 where the other company is stating it sold in 
12 March. They did continue to get into an argument 
13 on the phone with us about it but later hung up on 
14 us because they found out we were recording their 
15 phone call. 
16 THE COURT: Did you ever hear or get a 
17 copy of a notice of trustee sale? 
18 THE WITNESS: Sorry, what was that? 
19 THE COURT: Did you ever receive or get 
20 a copy of a notice of trustee sale that told you 
21 when the date of the sale would be? 
22 THE WITNESS: I received one in February 
23 but not on the day that I believe it was 
24 ReconTrust states in March. I never saw a posting 
25 or received anything on that date. 
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THE WITNESS: I did not. 
THF: COURT: Did you know that it was 
THE WITNESS: Not the one in March. 
7 were working with Rank of America at the time. 
8 were actually in the middle of another loan 
We 
We 
9 modification when we received our eviction notice 
10 on April 1 st , 2010, and it was a surprise to us 
11 because we were working with them up to that date 
12 on the phone several times a week with Fortified 
13 Financial to resolve this problem. 
14 THE COURT: The trustee's deed says that 
15 the sale occurred on January 14 th of 2010, and 





No, I did not. 
All right. Those are the 
19 questions I have. t:i,; 
20 Mr. Barlow, I'm going to allow you to 
21 provide any other questions that you think would 
22 be necessary and then I'll allow 
23 cross-examination. 
24 BY MR. BARLOW: 
25 
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Q Mr. Adamson, you mentioned a couple of 
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1 dates when it came to the trustee sale. If I 
2 remember correctly, you said that you were told 




Q You were told it by who that it was sold 
6 in March? 
7 A I want to say ReconTrust. It was either 
8 Bank of America or ReconTrust. When we had them 
9 on a three-way phone call, they would not agree to 
10 a sale date. 
11 MR. De HAAN: Your Honor, just for the 
12 record, I'd like to make an objection as to 
13 hearsay as well. Again, ReconTrust is not a party 
14 and neither is Bank of America, so what ever they 
15 allegedly said I think is hearsay. 
16 MR. BARLOW: Well, its, in fact, a 
17 statement against interest, Judge. 
1 8 THE COURT: But the interest -- it's a 
19 statement not against the defendant. An interest 
20 is a statement against someone who's not here, and 
21 so I am going to sustain that objection. 
22 hearsay. 
That's 
23 BY MR. BARLOW: 
24 Q So you were aware of a sale that was 
25 supposed to have occurred in March. 
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l any other sale dates that you were aware of? 
2 A All others were not carried through. I 
3 don't know the correct word. 
4 Q Let me turn your attention to Exhibit 
5 No. 2. 
6 THE COURT: He doesn't have that. I've 
7 got it. 
8 MR. BARLOW: Do you have copies of 
9 those, Judge? 
10 THE COURT: I just gave him mine. 
11 you have one I could follow along with, I'd 
12 appreciate it. 
If 
13 MR. BARLOW: In the folder that I gave 
14 you -- I don't have them marked -- there's a 
15 stapled -- this is the front page of the stapled 
16 section, and then if you turn to page 4 -- I'm 
17 sorry, page 5 is the exhibit that we're referring 
18 to which is Exhibit 2. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. So go ahead. 
20 BY MR. BARLOW: 
21 Q If you look down at the paragraph that 
22 starts with "Whereas ReconTrust Company" and then 
23 you follow that down, it says that the time and 
24 place of the sale as January 14 th at 1:00 p.m. 
25 Were you aware of that date prior to 
A-50 
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1 that date? Were you aware that there was going to 
2 be a sale on your home conducted prior to 
3 January 14 th ? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Were you aware that the sale date was 
6 J-anuary 14th? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And how were you aware of that? 
9 A On this sale date I actually got this 





On January 14 th ? 
I'd say it was a few days before. I 
13 don't remember the exact date. 
14 Q However, you mentioned a couple other 
15 dates that came to mind. So you were unaware that 
16 the property -- you were unaware of the actual 
1 7 sale date; is that correct? 
18 A We were told by the Bank of Amerjca that 
19 it did not sell on that date. 
20 MR. DeHAAN: I'm going to object to the 
21 question. I think that's been asked and answered. 
22 I think his testimony was that he was aware of the 
23 sale date. 
24 MR. BARLOW: I was trying to find out 
25 exactly when he became aware of the sale date, 
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/. Tf-1 F: CO UR T : And when he became aware was 
3 sometime before that date, right? 
4 
5 
MR. BARLOW: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay, then go ahead. 
6 BY MR. BARLOW: 
7 Q Now I'd like to draw your attention up 
8 to the very top of this document three lines down 
9 from the top. The first line is doc ID and then 
10 trustee's deed and then the county recorder, and 
11 then the fourth line is the date on which this 
12 document was re corded. Will you please tell us 
13 the date on which this document was recorded? Do 
14 you see that? What's the date that this document 
15 was recorded? 
16 A 4/5 of 2010. 
17 Q So this document was recorded on 
18 April 5 th of 2010 which is approximately four 






Now, you still occupy the home; is that 
22 correct? GiJ 
23 A Correct. 
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Is that correct? 
Yes. 
Have you attempted since the sale to 





Since the sale? 
Yeah. You stated 
7 clarify this in my notes. 
I'm just trying to 
You stated that you 
8 were still working with Bank of America and also 
9 the company that took $3,700. 
10 A Fortified Financial. Correct. We were 
11 told that the sale in January on January 14 th 
12 did not happen, and we continued with the loan 
13 modification at that point. So when we received 
14 our eviction notice on April 1 st 
' 
2010, it came 
15 to a surprise to us. 
16 MR. DeHAAN: Again, Your Honor, I'm 
17 going to object to the statement. Any statement 
18 indicating what Bank of America told him is 
19 hearsay. 
20 THE COURT: I agree it is hearsay, and 
21 I'm not sure that it's relevant. And I know I've 
22 hit you cold, Mr. Barlow. I wanted some idea of 
23 what was happening before and after the sale. 
2 4 BY MR. BARLOW: 
25 Q Did you continue to pay the HOA fees on 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 











And then what have you done also to 
4 protect your interest in the property? Have you 
5 fiJ.ed any other litigation? 
6 A Not with this property. Well, 
7 beforehand we had litigation with Bank of America 
8 but. 
9 Q 1 guess the question is, are you aware 










In your name; is that correct? 
Correct. 
So you're a party to a federal action 









give me a second. 
Counsel, when was that 






I can find the date. 
Approximately. If either 
23 MR. DeHAAN: Counsel, I have a docket of 
2~ that case if you'd prefer. It was filed 
25 November 5, 2010. The case is 2:10-CV-01099. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you. I just wanted 
2 the date. Thanks. 
3 BY MR. BARLOW: 
4 Q Let me turn your attention again to 
5 Exhibit No. 2 which is the trustee's deed. Do you 
6 consider this deed to be valid, this trustee's 
7 deed? 
8 A No. 
9 MR. DeHAAN: Objection, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: It calls for a conclusion of 
11 law, so I'm going to sustain the objection. 
12 MR. BARLOW: I understand that, Your 
13 Honor. That's all the questions that I have right 
14 now, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. One final 
16 question. Have you made any efforts to make 
17 payments on the loan since you fell behind? 
18 THE WITNESS: I have not since I was 
19 told that they wouldn't accept them. 
20 THE COURT: And have you paid the taxes 
21 on the property? 
22 THE WITNESS: They were included in the 
23 escrow, so I would have loved to, but I have not 
24 been able to. 
25 THE COURT: Does counsel know if there's 
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1 been any tax sale initiated by the county for 
2 failure to pay taxes? 
3 MR. DeHAAN: I'm unaware if there's been 
4 a tax sale or a tax notice regarding the unpaid 
5 taxes. 
6 THE COURT: That's really all I have. 
7 And so. 
8 MR. BARLOW: May I ask a follow-up 
9 question? 
10 THE COURT: Sure. 
11 BY MR. BARLOW: 
12 Q Your Honor asked you if you had made any 
13 effort to make payment. You stated that they told 
14 you you couldn't make a payment. 
15 upon that a little bit. 
Will you expand 
16 A Basically if I made a payment it 
17 wouldn't do anything to better my case or assist 
18 me in getting a loan modification. At one point 
19 in time I was told not to make a payment because 
20 of when you're going through the loan modification 
21 program it can mess up the numbers, so they 
22 advised me not to. 
23 
24 
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MR. BARLOW: All right, thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. DeHaan, go ahead. 
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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. De HAAN: 
3 Q Just one followup question, Mr. Adamson. 
4 I understand your testimony you missed a payment 




Q And then have you -- and then you've not 
8 made any payments since that date, correct? 
9 
10 
A I have not. 
MR. DeHAAN: Thank you. No further 
11 questions, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: All right, thanks. You can 
13 step down unless Mr. Barlow has any more 
14 questions. 
15 We really now -- based on that, do you 
16 have any more evidence that you would like to 
1 7 present? 
18 isn't it? 
19 
I think mostly it's legal argument, 
MR. BARLOW: Judge, it is oral argument. 
20 I would, however, like to present, if the Court 
21 would allow me, I'd like to present evidence of 
22 well, it would be oral argument, and I would 
23 submit this to the Court, the Fannie Mae v 
24 Sundquist case. l 'd like the Court to take notice 
25 of this case. This is directly to the point that 
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